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The Limits of Police Interrogation:
The Limits of the Charter
Hon. Justice Gary T. Trotter*

I. INTRODUCTION
A confession has long been recognized as a powerful piece of evidence
in a criminal trial, a virtual “queen of proofs”.1 It is now well accepted
that it is a “natural manifestation of human experience” that judges and
juries generally accord great weight to confessions.2 As Cory J. explained
in R. v. Hodgson:3
It is because of the tremendous significance attributed to confessions
and the innate realization that they could be obtained by improper means
that the circumstances surrounding a confession have for centuries been
carefully scrutinized to determine whether it should be admitted. 4

This concern for the proper limits of police interrogation has been
galvanized by a growing body of literature that suggests that false
confessions may play a significant role in wrongful convictions.5 Yet,
despite the importance of police interrogation to the investigative process,
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms6 has had only a limited
*
Superior Court of Justice, Ontario. This paper is based partly on an earlier paper
entitled, “Voluntariness in a Nutshell”, presented at the Ontario Bar Association Conference, The
Ultimate Guide on Hearsay and Voluntariness, on February 3, 2007, in Toronto.
1
See Peter Brooks, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), at 4. In extravagant terms, Brooks also writes:
“Meanwhile, Western culture, most strikingly since the Romantic era to our day, has made
confessional speech a prime mark of authenticity, par excellence the kind of speech in which the
individual authenticates his inner truth.”
2
See R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at 460 (S.C.C.), per Cory J.
3
[1998] S.C.J. No. 66, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J.
No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 29 (S.C.C.), in which Charron J. said: “[A] confession is a very
powerful item of evidence against an accused which, in and of itself, can ground a conviction.”
4
R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), at 460 (S.C.C.).
5
See Christopher Sherrin, “False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law” (2005)
30 Queen’s L.J. 601 and Gary T. Trotter, “False Confessions and Wrongful Convictions” (2003-2004)
35 Ottawa L. Rev. 179.
6
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
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impact on what takes place inside the interrogation room. As Professor
Lisa Dufraimont observes, “the common law rule excluding voluntary
confessions remains the suspect’s best protection against coercive
interrogation.”7 Of course, it would be an overstatement to say that the
Charter has had no impact on interrogation. Rules have been developed
under sections 10(a) and (b) of the Charter that place limits on the timing,
and, to a very limited extent, the substantive content of interrogations.
But limits on what transpires during an interrogation have been left
largely to the dynamic common law confessions rule.8
Some critics lament the fact that the law relating to interrogations
seems to have been left behind by the Charter.9 For those who favour
greater control over the interrogation process, the Charter is thought to
promise more meaningful protection for detained persons. However, this
proposition is debatable. There are many benefits associated with leaving
the law of interrogation to the realm of the common law confessions
rule, benefits that might be eroded by attempts to “Charter-ize” this area
of the law. Moreover, given that Charter values are reflected in the
modern common law confessions rule, it is doubtful that the law would
develop in a more robust manner if it were to become more firmly
rooted in the Charter. The majority of the Supreme Court essentially
reached this conclusion in its recent judgment in R. v. Singh.10

II. CHARTER RIGHTS IMPLICATED IN THE
INTERROGATION PROCESS
There are numerous rights under the Charter that might be said to be
implicated in police interrogation. Section 10(a), which guarantees the
right of a detainee to be “informed promptly of the reasons” for arrest
7
Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current Law
and Future Directions”, in this volume, at 249.
8
There are numerous excellent treatments of the common law rule in Canada. See David
Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005), Chapter 8;
John Sopinka, Sidney Lederman & Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1999) (and second edition supplement, 2004), Chapter 8; S.C. Hill et al.,
McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, 4th ed. Looseleaf (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2003-),
Chapter 8; and Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON:
Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 134-43.
9
See Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current
Law and Future Directions” in this volume and Don Stuart, “Oickle: The Supreme Court’s Recipe
for Coercive Interrogation” (2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 188.
10
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.). The implications of this decision
are discussed below.
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and detention, is a pre-condition to interrogation of a detained person.
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the section rather
conservatively, with little in the way of consequences when breaches of
the section are established.11
The most obvious Charter right implicated in limiting interrogations
is section 10(b) of the Charter, which guarantees the right to counsel to
persons who are “detained”. Section 10(b) has generated a complex web of
doctrine, addressing many aspects of the encounter between the police
and a detained person.12 At the heart of the section 10(b) is the right
against self-incrimination, a value pursued in many aspects of the
jurisprudence of former Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, the architect of
many of the early Supreme Court’s decisions applying the Charter to the
criminal law.13 In the context of the right to counsel, Lamer C.J.C. said
the following in R. v. Bartle:14
The purpose of the right to counsel guaranteed by s.10(b) of the
Charter is to provide detainees with an opportunity to be informed of
their rights and obligations under the law and, most importantly, to obtain
advice on how to exercise those rights and fulfil those obligations:
R. v. Manninen (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.), at pp. 391-3. This
opportunity is made available because, when an individual is detained
by state authorities, he or she is put in a position of disadvantage
relative to the state. Not only has this person suffered a deprivation of
liberty, but also this person may be at risk of incriminating him or
herself. Accordingly, a person who is “detained” within the meaning
of s. 10 of the Charter is in immediate need of legal advice in order to
protect his or her right against self-incrimination and to assist him or
her in regaining his or her liberty … 15 (emphasis added)

11
The Court has addressed this section of the Charter on only a few occasions. See R. v.
Greffe, [1990] S.C.J. No, 32, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.); R. v. Evans, [1991] S.C.J. No. 31, 63 C.C.C.
(3d) 289 (S.C.C.); R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, 39 C.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Mann,
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.).
12
See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON:
Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 331-53.
13
There are many aspects of the criminal law that Lamer C.J.C. addressed with self incrimination in mind. One obvious area was s. 10(b) of the Charter. This theme also dominated his
vision of the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2), starting in R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15,
33 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). Chief Justice Lamer’s views on self-incrimination are explored in the
context of when it is appropriate to re-open the Crown’s case and amend an information: see R. v.
P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, 89 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).
14
[1994] S.C.J. No. 74, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).
15
R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 300 (S.C.C.). See also R. v.
Jones, [1994] S.C.J. No. 42, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.).
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From this theme, a number of duties have been imposed on the
police, obligations that must be discharged before a detained individual
may be questioned. These are called informational16 and implementational17
duties. They are designed to further the objective of preventing the
accused from incriminating himself. They comprise a set of procedural
ground rules for interrogation. With one exception, they fall short of
regulating the substance of an interrogation (in terms of the questions
the police may ask and the tactics they may use).
Until the police have discharged their implementational duties
(i.e., to retain and instruct counsel), they must refrain from questioning18
or otherwise attempting to elicit information19 from the detained person.
This is essentially a “holding-off” period.20 However, once the detainee
has had the opportunity to consult with counsel, subject to comments
concerning section 7 of the Charter below, the police are free to question
a detained person, even in the face of protestations that he or she does
not wish to participate in the interview.21 This means that, while section
10(b) provides protection against self-incrimination through access to
counsel, it does not create a right not to be interviewed or interrogated
by state officials. This puts a great premium on defence counsel giving
advice to a detained person to warn him or her that the police may
continue with their questioning when the call with counsel is completed.
16
Flowing from R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.), and other
cases, the police must advise the detainee of the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay.
This includes the duty to advise of free legal advice and the availability of legal advice through a
“1-800” service, in locations where it exists: see R. v. Brydges, [1990] S.C.J. No. 8, 53 C.C.C. (3d)
330 (S.C.C.).
17
The police must provide a reasonable opportunity for the accused to consult with
counsel (R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Baig, [1987]
S.C.J. No. 77, 61 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.)) in private (R. v. Playford, [1987] O.J. No. 1107, 40 C.C.C.
(3d) 142 (Ont. C.A.).
18
See R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.); R. v. Prosper,
[1994] S.C.J. No. 72, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Brydges, [1990] S.C.J. No. 8, 53
C.C.C. (3d) 330 (S.C.C.).
19
R. v. McKenzie, [2002] O.J. No. 3029, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 530 (Ont. C.A.).
20
R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Lewis,
[2007] O.J. No. 1784, 86 O.R. (3d) 46 (Ont. C.A.). Relying on R. v. Plaha, [2004] O.J. No. 3484,
188 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), the Lewis Court found that the breach of this duty tainted
statements taken shortly thereafter that were taken in compliance with s. 10(b).
21
See R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.), in which McLachlin J.
(as she then was) held at 188:
Presumably, counsel will inform the accused of the right to remain silent. If the police are
not posing as undercover officers and the accused chooses to volunteer information, there
will be no violation of the Charter. Police persuasion, short of denying the suspect the right
to choose or depriving him of an operating mind, does not breach the right to silence.
See also R. v. Roy, [2003] O.J. No. 4252, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 298, at 302-303 (Ont. C.A.).
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Consequently, accused persons ought to be advised, not just of their
right to remain silent, but how to exercise that right.
Everything that has been discussed above is a pre-condition to the
commencement of an interview or interrogation. A further obligation
sometimes arises once questioning has commenced. If the reasons for
the detainee’s detention change during questioning, the informational
and implementational duties are triggered once again. This may occur
when the accused’s jeopardy changes (for example, when an assault victim
dies and the charge is upgraded to a homicide),22 or when the investigation
turns in the direction of other offences for which the detained person
was not initially arrested.23
The only rule to emanate from section 10(b) of the Charter that
impacts on the substance of police questioning arises from the Supreme
Court’s decision in R. v. Burlingham.24 The accused was detained by the
police and was being questioned on a charge of murder. The accused
stood by his right to remain silent. Among other tactics, police made
“repeated disparaging comments … about defence counsel’s loyalty,
commitment, availability, as well as the amount of his legal fees”.25 The
Court held that this conduct was improper. In particular, Iacobucci J.
addressed the nature of the interrogation insofar as it related to the
accused’s lawyer:
. . . s. 10(b) specifically prohibits the police, as they did in this case,
from belittling an accused’s lawyer with the express goal or effect of
undermining the accused’s confidence in and relationship with defence
counsel. It makes no sense for s. 10(b) of the Charter to provide for
the right to retain and instruct counsel if law enforcement authorities
are able to undermine either an accused’s confidence in his or her lawyer
or the solicitor-client relationship.26

All other limitations imposed by section 10(b) focus on the external
parameters for interrogation, conditions-precedent for questioning.
Burlingham stands as an exception because it prohibits a specific line of
questioning.

22

See R. v. Black, [1989] S.C.J. No. 81, 50 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
See R. v. Evans, [1991] S.C.J. No. 31, 63 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Borden,
[1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (S.C.C.).
24
[1995] S.C.J. No. 39, 97 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
25
R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, 97 C.C.C. (3d) 385, at 393 (S.C.C.).
26
R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, 97 C.C.C. (3d) 385, at 397 (S.C.C.).
23
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The right to silence, recognized to be an aspect of section 7 of the
Charter,27 is sometimes resorted to in the interrogation context. Section 7
is typically28 asserted in circumstances of persistent questioning by the
police, after section 10(b) compliance, but in the face of assertions by
the detained person that he or she wishes to exercise his or her right to
silence. Success on this basis has been mixed.29 More recently, judges
have approached this question by exploring the connection between the
common law confessions rule and the right to silence in section 7 of the
Charter. In R. v. Roy,30 Doherty J. observed that “[t]he trial judge clearly
linked the voluntariness argument and the claim that the appellant had
been denied his right to silence. That link exists both in and on the facts
of this case.”31 Ultimately, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial
judge that, under the rubric of the common law confessions rule, the
accused had not been deprived of his right to choose whether to remain
silent.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada in Singh32 has finally
addressed this issue, which has been percolating in the jurisprudence of
some appellate courts for many years. Mr. Singh was charged with first
degree murder. After consulting with counsel, he advised the police that
he did not wish to make a statement. The police persisted in the face of
many more protestations from the accused that he wished to remain
silent. The trial judge found that his subsequent admissions to the police
were voluntary. This conclusion was affirmed by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal.33 In a 5:4 split, the Supreme Court upheld this decision.
The majority held that, when an accused person is in detention and is
speaking to a person that he or she knows is a person in authority, the
confessions rule “effectively subsumes” the right to silence.34 In this
27

See R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.), R. v. Broyles, [1991]
S.C.J. No. 95, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Liew, [1999] S.C.J. No. 51, 137 C.C.C. (3d)
353 (S.C.C.). The right to silence is also reflected in other sections of the Charter, including s. 11(c)
(right not to be compelled to be a witness) and s. 13 (right against self-incrimination).
28
R. c. Otis, [2000] J.Q. no 4320, 37 C.R. (5th) 320 (Que. C.A.).
29
See the discussion of this body of law in Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian
Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 128-29. See also Guy
Cournoyer, “Saying ‘No’ to Interrogation: The Quebec Court of Appeal Asserts a Meaningful Right
to Silence” (2001) 37 C.R. (5th) 342.
30
[2004] O.J. No. 4252, 15 C.R. (6th) 282 (Ont. C.A.).
31
R. v. Roy, [2004] O.J. No. 4252, 15 C.R. (6th) 282, at 285-86 (S.C.C.). For commentary
on this case, see Guy Cournoyer, “Annotation: R. v. Roy” (2003) 15 C.R. (6th) 283.
32
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.).
33
R. v. Singh, [2006] B.C.J. No. 1274, 38 C.R. (6th) 217 (B.C.C.A.).
34
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).
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context, the two tests (i.e., whether the right to silence has been infringed
and whether the voluntariness test is satisfied) are “functionally
equivalent”.35 As Charron J. (McLachlin C.J.C. and Bastarache, Deschamps
and Rothstein JJ., concurring) explained for the majority:
Therefore, voluntariness, as it is understood today, requires that
the court scrutinize whether the accused was denied his or her right to
silence. The right to silence is defined in accordance with constitutional
principles. A finding of voluntariness will therefore be determinative
of the s. 7 issue. In other words, if the Crown proves voluntariness
beyond a reasonable doubt, there can be no finding of a Charter violation
of the right to silence in respect of the same statement. The converse
holds true as well. If the circumstances are such that an accused is able
to show on a balance of probabilities a breach of his or her right to silence,
the Crown will not be in a position to meet the voluntariness test. 36

Essentially, persistent questioning in the face of insistence on silence
is an inquiry into whether the accused “exercised free will by choosing
to make a statement”,37 which, as discussed in the next part, is at the
heart of the voluntariness doctrine. The majority could not find error with
the trial judge’s conclusion that Mr. Singh’s will was not overborne by
the persistence of the police.
In a dissenting judgment, Fish J. (Binnie, LeBel and Abella JJ.,
concurring) held that Mr. Singh’s rights under section 7 of the Charter
were violated by the persistent questioning of the police. Quoting from
Hebert,38 the dissenters held that the police “unfairly frustrated [Mr.
Singh’s] decision on the question of whether to make a statement to
the authorities”.39 In doing so, Fish J. rejected the contention that the
protections articulated in Hebert were restricted to detainees who were
dealing with undercover officers or other detainees.40 The dissenters also
35

R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 39 (S.C.C.). The majority did
recognize that s. 7 offers a residual protection in certain circumstances, such as when the accused
person is dealing with an undercover officer.
36
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 37 (S.C.C.).
37
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 53 (S.C.C.).
38
R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.).
39
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 63 (S.C.C.). Square brackets
inserted in original text.
40
After quoting from R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.), Fish J.
held at para. 62:
Nothing in either passage, or elsewhere in Hebert, suggests that McLachlin J. limited the
right of silence under s. 7 of the Charter to statements made by a detainee to undercover
police officers or to other detainees. On the contrary, in determining its scope on a principled
basis, Justice McLachlin dealt with the right to silence in the context of statements made
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found that Mr. Singh’s right to counsel was “collaterally” infringed in
the circumstances by the officer’s comments about his counsel’s advice
to remain silent.41 More fundamentally, Fish J. held that the protection
afforded by section 7 of the Charter is not subsumed within the confessions
rule and that a confession that is otherwise voluntary may still, in some
circumstances, infringe section 7 of the Charter.42
For those hoping for more robust protections against interrogation,
Singh43 will be a disappointment. However, this paper does not dwell
upon the issue of whether there should be greater or lesser procedural
safeguards for those interrogated by the police. For present purposes,
Singh is important because it demonstrates that the scope of protection
may be modulated within the confines of the common law confessions
rule (albeit, a rule, the contemporary incarnation of which is imbued with
Charter values).

III. VOLUNTARINESS AND THE CHARTER
The Supreme Court of Canada has addressed the substantive content
of the common law confessions rule on many occasions prior to the
entrenchment of the Charter. After 1982, the issue has arisen for
consideration in only a handful of cases. Earlier treatments by the Court44
may have supported the assertion that the “confessions rule has attained
some indeterminate constitutional status under the Charter”.45 The
Supreme Court’s recent decisions have perpetuated this indeterminate
status. In R. v. Oickle,46 perhaps one of the most important Canadian
criminal cases in many years, the Court purported to cut ties between the
“to the police” or “to the authorities” by detainees under interrogation. And she dealt with
it as a constitutional right not subsumed by the common law confessions rule. (emphasis in
the original)
The majority interpreted Hebert more narrowly, restricting it to circumstances in which the accused
person was unaware that he/she was speaking to a person in authority: see paras. 46-47.
41
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 62 (S.C.C.).
42
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at paras. 73-78 (S.C.C.).
43
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.).
44
See R. v. Whittle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 11 (S.C.C.), in which Sopinka J.
said at 24: “While the confession rule and the right to silence originate in the common law, as
principles of fundamental justice they have acquired constitutional status under s. 7 of the Charter.”
This passage was quoted by Bastarache J. in R. v. G. (B.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, 135 C.C.C. (3d) 303,
at 318 (S.C.C.).
45
Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current Law
and Future Directions”, in this volume, at 249.
46
[2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
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Charter and the voluntariness rule. As discussed above, Singh47 purports
to re-establish some link between the two, but in a manner that will have
little practical impact on substantive outcomes in terms of the admissibility
of statements.
In Oickle,48 the Court imposed further structure on the developing
common law confessions rule, clarifying the various categories of
involuntariness, and elaborating on the role of oppressive circumstances
in undermining the voluntariness of statements.49 The Court also considered
the social-legal context in which the present law operates,50 as well as
the values embodied in the dynamic common law rule. Writing for the
majority, Iacobucci J. confirmed that the rule is concerned with ensuring
the reliability of statements (i.e., weeding out false confessions), but also
“protection of the accused’s rights and fairness in the criminal process”.51
In terms of fairness, the Court touched on the issue of the right to silence,
holding that the confessions rule can provide appropriate protection:
Voluntariness is the touchstone of the confessions rule. Whether the
concern is threats or promises, the lack of an operating mind, or police
trickery that unfairly denies the accused’s right to silence, this Court’s
jurisprudence has consistently protected the accused from having
involuntary confessions introduced into evidence. If a confession is
involuntary for any of these reasons, it is inadmissible.52 (emphasis added)

This provided explicit confirmation that the common law confessions
rule is capable of accommodating right to silence claims.
The Oickle53 Court also faced the question of whether the future
development of the confessions rule would be best entrusted to the
Charter. This was prompted by the Court’s earlier decision in Hebert,54
in which McLachlin J. (as she then was) interpreted the right to silence in
light of the common law confessions rule. The Oickle Court considered
47

R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
49
See Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current
Law and Future Directions”, in this volume, in which she reviews the various categories: threats
and inducements, operating mind, oppression and other police trickery.
50
See the discussion of the empirical literature considered by the Court in Gary T. Trotter,
“False Confessions and Wrongful Convictions” (2003-2004) 35 Ottawa L. Rev. 179.
51
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at 354 (S.C.C.), quoting John
Sopinka, Sidney Lederman & Alan W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1999), at 339.
52
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at 354 (S.C.C.).
53
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
54
R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.).
48
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the corresponding question of whether the Charter should subsume the
rule. Justice Iacobucci rejected this position:
But I do not believe that this view is correct, for several reasons.
First, the confessions rule has a broader scope than the Charter. For
example, the protections of s. 10 only apply “on arrest or detention”.
By contrast, the confessions rule applies whenever a person in
authority questions a suspect. Second, the Charter applies a different
burden and standard of proof from that under the confessions rule.
Under the former, the burden is on the accused to show, on a balance
of probabilities, a violation of constitutional rights. Under the latter,
the burden is on the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt
that the confession was voluntary. Finally, the remedies are different. The
Charter excludes evidence obtained in violation of its provisions under
s. 24(2) only if admitting the evidence would bring the administration
of justice into disrepute: see R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, R. v.
Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, and the related jurisprudence. By
contrast, a violation of the confessions rule always warrants exclusion.
These various differences illustrate that the Charter is not an
exhaustive catalogue of rights. Instead, it represents a bare minimum
below which the law must not fall. A necessary corollary of this
statement is that the law, whether by statute or common law, can offer
protections beyond those guaranteed by the Charter. The common law
confessions rule is one such doctrine, and it would be a mistake to
confuse it with the protections given by the Charter. While it may be
appropriate, as in Hebert, supra, to interpret one in light of the other, it
would be a mistake to assume one subsumes the other entirely. 55

The majority in Singh recognized these same relative benefits56 and
held that, instead of the confessions rule being subsumed by the Charter,
“the confessions rule effectively subsumes the constitutional right to silence
in circumstances where an obvious person in authority is interrogating a
person who is in detention.”57 In these circumstances, the two tests are
“functionally equivalent”.58
On Iacobucci J.’s analysis, there are considerable benefits to addressing
the limits of interrogation through the common law. The most profound
benefits are reflected in the burden and standard of proof. Apart from
the adjudication on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence, there is no
55
56
57
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R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at 340 (S.C.C).
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 25 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).
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other juncture in the criminal process where proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is the standard of proof. Combined with the burden of proof, all
an accused person need do is raise a reasonable doubt that the statement
was involuntary on any of the grounds recognized in Oickle.59 Moreover,
the Crown must adduce evidence to show the full context in which the
statement was made, which generally involves calling the evidence of
all persons in authority who came into contact with the accused leading
up to the making of the statement.60 By contrast, on a Charter motion,
the accused bears the burden of proof, on a balance of probabilities, on
the issues of both breach and remedy.61
When Iacobucci J. wrote, it was debatable whether the differing
remedial frameworks (common law versus the Charter) favoured
adjudication under the common law. It is true that a finding of
involuntariness mandates the exclusion of evidence. However, at the time
Oickle62 was decided, when conscriptive evidence (a statement being the
paradigmatic example) was found to be taken in violation of Charter
rights, exclusion was virtually automatic.63 However, the circumstances

59

See R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hodgson,
[1998] S.C.J. No. 66, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.); R. v. Moore-McFarlane, [2001] O.J. No. 4646,
160 C.C.C. (3d) 493 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v. Backhouse, [2005] O.J. No. 754, 194 C.C.C. (3d) 1
(Ont. C.A.). See R. v. West, [2003] N.S.J. No. 457, 182 C.C.C. (3d) 83 (N.S.C.A.), in which the
trial judge said that the burden on the Crown was “substantial”, but less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal held this to be a serious error that could not be cured by the
curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. In R. v. Tessier,
[2002] S.C.J. No. 6, 162 C.C.C. (3d) 478, at para. 2 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court approved of the
following approach of the dissenting judge in the New Brunswick Court of Appeal (R. v. Tessier,
[2001] N.B.J. No. 131, 153 C.C.C. (3d) 361, at 393 (N.B.C.A.)): “The appropriate test to be applied
in this case was whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary
by reason of a combination of oppressive conditions and inducements, taking into account all the
circumstances surrounding the taking of the impugned statements.”
60
See R. v. Koszulap, [1974] O.J. No. 726, 20 C.C.C. (2d) 193 (Ont. C.A.), in which
Martin J.A. held at 198: “The burden of proving that a confession was made voluntarily is not
discharged by evidence that it was preceded by a caution and by the evidence of the police officer
who obtained the statement that it was not induced by threats or promises. All the surrounding
circumstances must be examined in order to enable the Court to determine whether the statement
was made voluntarily.” See also R. v. Holmes, [2002] O.J. No. 4178, 169 C.C.C. (3d) 344 (Ont. C.A.),
in which it was held that proof that the accused had exercised his right to counsel was no substitute
for proving that the accused was not mistreated during a 16-hour period.
61
See R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
62
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
63
A number of the Supreme Court’s decisions, starting with R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J.
No. 15, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), and followed by many others (in particular, see R. v. Stillman,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 34, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.)), have been taken to strongly suggest that
exclusion is automatic. However, in R. v. Elias; R. v. Orbanski, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, 196 C.C.C.
(3d) 481 (S.C.C.), LeBel J. (dissenting in part) stated at 518: “ … our Court has not suggested that
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under which conscriptive evidence is excluded has since become less
clear, with change potentially on the horizon. If the law moves at all on
this issue, there is only room to move in a manner that would make the
automatic exclusion remedy under the common law more favourable.
Another reason, not advanced in Oickle64 or Singh,65 for keeping the
common law rule separate from the Charter relates to preliminary
inquiries. While the provisions relating to the conduct of preliminary
inquiries have been amended to streamline the process,66 in order to
introduce the statement of the accused into evidence at a preliminary
inquiry, the Crown must still establish that the statement is voluntary.67
Conversely, the Charter does not apply at a preliminary inquiry. In a
ruling that came after Oickle (but before Singh), the Supreme Court in
R. v. Hynes68 held that a judge conducting a preliminary inquiry is not a
court of competent jurisdiction and, as such, has no power to exclude a
statement obtained in violation of s. 10(b) of the Charter.69 Therefore,
subsuming the confessions rule within the Charter might have the result
of constricting the ambit of the confessions rule by excluding its application
from preliminary inquiries. Alternatively, subsuming the common law
within the Charter could result in the undesirable development of two
versions of the confessions rule, a purely common law version applicable
at the preliminary inquiry, and a Charter-based version at trial.
One complaint about the common law confessions rule is that it fails
to impose clear limits on the police.70 Others have suggested that Oickle71
has done the opposite and has created a “recipe” or list of coercive

the presence of conscriptive evidence that has been obtained illegally is always the end of the
matter and that the other stages and factors of the process become irrelevant.”
64
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
65
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.).
66
See Part XVIII of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
67
See s. 542(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. See R. v. Pickett, [1975] O.J.
No. 675, 28 C.C.C. (2d) 297 (Ont. C.A.). See R. v. Rajab, [2005] O.J. No. 5795, 193 C.C.C. (3d) 436
(Ont. C.J.) for an example of exclusion of a statement at a preliminary inquiry on the basis of
voluntariness.
68
[2001] S.C.J. No. 80, 159 C.C.C. (3d) 359 (S.C.C.).
69
See also the companion case R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] S.C.J. No. 79, 159 C.C.C.
(3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
70
See Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current
Law and Future Directions”, in this volume.
71
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
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techniques.72 It is unrealistic to expect bright lines in this area. In Oickle,
the Court favoured a contextual approach, holding that:
Hard and fast rules simply cannot account for the variety of circumstances
that vitiate the voluntariness of a confession, and would inevitably
result in a rule that would be both over- and under-inclusive. A trial
judge should therefore consider all the relevant factors when reviewing
a confession.73

Singh74 too fails to impose any bright-line distinctions in this context.
Beyond the theoretical debate between the majority and minority
judgments in Singh, all judges accepted the proposition that persistent
questioning by police officers, in the face of an assertion of the right to
remain silent, may trigger the operation of the common law confessions
rule or the right to silence, as the case may be. However, Singh provides
little guidance on where to draw the line. Oickle75 establishes that the
common law confessions rule is dynamic, capable of changing to the
realities of modern police investigations. Singh confirms that the rule
vindicates right to silence claims. Even if the Supreme Court could be
persuaded to develop “hard and fast rules” in this area, and working on
the debatable assumption that this is desirable, clarity is achieved just as
effectively within the confines of the common law rule, without drawing
upon the Charter. Indeed, Parliament could establish clear guidelines
and ground rules for interrogation.76
The types of complaints made in the right to silence cases involve
policy choices about the proper role of the police in the interrogation
process. If the law is developed to provide greater protection to detainees
whose assertions of the right to remain silent are ignored by the police,
it is unlikely that “hard and fast” rules will emerge as a response to this
situation. Like many questions concerning interrogation, a contextual
approach seems more sensible. The dynamic common law confessions
rule seems ideally suited to this task. There is nothing inherent in the
Charter that promises to deliver greater or more clearly defined protections.

72

See Don Stuart, “Oickle: The Supreme Court’s Recipe for Coercive Interrogation”
(2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 188, who actually compiles lists of permissible and impermissible techniques
in light of Oickle.
73
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at 345 (S.C.C.).
74
R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.).
75
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
76
See Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current
Law and Future Directions”.
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Singh77 proves this point. The resolution of the dispute over the
admissibility of Mr. Singh’s utterances did not turn on the choice of
analytical frameworks. It was open to the majority to find that the type
of conduct engaged in by the police undermined the voluntariness of
Mr. Singh’s utterances. In the end, the majority was not prepared to find
that the trial judge erred in holding that the conduct of the police did not
cross the line. Even if the majority had accepted the minority’s more
robust view of the Charter in this context, it is difficult to envisage the
majority coming to a different conclusion on the merits. It addressed the
same question of value, but without the aid of the Charter.

IV. CONCLUSION
Since 1982, there has been a strong tendency to dispatch all criminal
law problems directly to the Charter. Admittedly, the Charter has
revolutionized some aspects of criminal law. However, the Charter is
not a panacea; it does not automatically prescribe ready-made solutions
for all perceived shortcomings in the criminal law. In the context of
confessions, the Charter is accompanied by significant procedural baggage
that would render relief less accessible. In the end, our law relating to
the interrogation of suspects engages a complex web of values that
sometimes conflict.78 Policy options abound and compete for ascendant
positions. Sensible and well-grounded reforms do not require the currency
of the Charter to succeed. This has been the experience of Canadian law
concerning the interrogation of suspects. If the law relating to the
interrogation of suspects is inadequate, and this is far from apparent, it
cannot be seriously maintained that this is due to the fact that the
common law confessions rule has not been subsumed by the Charter.
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R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.).
In R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321, Iacobucci J. said at 354:
“Wigmore perhaps summed up the point best when he said that voluntariness is ‘shorthand for a
complex of values’: Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1970, vol. 3, 826, at p. 351.” This
passage is quoted with approval by Charron J. in R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48, at
para. 30 (S.C.C.).
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